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Introduction
Standard auction theory predicts that, in a private value English oral auction, the winner will be the bidder with the highest valuation for the object, and the selling price will be the second-highest valuation. In those auctions, a reasonable strategy for a bidder would be to increase each bid by the minimum bid increment. This solution is referred to as the "ratchet solution," "straightforward bidding" or as "pedestrian bidding." Jump biddings occur when a new offer is submitted that is above the old offer plus the minimum bid increment permitted.
In this paper, I study the sequence of bidding in an open-outcry English auction to examine how the strategic bidding process affects price determination. I do this by studying the nature of jump biddings in data I have collected from a series of public auctions of used cars in New Jersey. The auction literature has not fully addressed and characterized jump biddings in English auctions.
In order to characterize jump biddings, and because the auctions I study have no seller's reserve price, I define the "First Jump" as the first offer submitted by any bidder.
The "Second Jump" is the difference between the second offer submitted by a bidder and the first offer. The "Last Jump" is the difference between the winning bid and the previous offer. I further define the "Average Jump" 2 of all jumps excluding the First and Last jumps. Figure 1 describes these variables graphically.
I find that jump biddings are a widespread empirical regularity in the sale of all items. The jumps depend on the presale estimate of the item's price and are not affected by the selling order. For almost all items, bidders use jump biddings to increase the current offer. Furthermore, on average, the First Jump is greater than the Second Jump, which is greater than the Average Jump, which is greater than the Last Jump. I offer several explanations for the existence of jump biddings.
These findings suggest that there is some strategic bidding behavior in the way bidders advance their bids. Bidders consider the way the auction progresses, which implies that a bidder's strategy includes not only the stopping point along the bidding path, but also the precise nature of the path that led there. I suggest a way to use the jump biddings to determine whether an open-outcry auction is best interpreted with models that assume private-or common-item valuations, and conclude that these auctions are consistent with the common value interpretation. Under the assumption of independent private values, the bidding history should not affect the point at which a bidder drops out.
This is not the case in a common value auction, in which each stage of the auction is used as a device for signaling. The selling price in an English auction with common values will be path dependent. Hence, a simple test of the effect of the First Jump on the selling price determines the type of the auction.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I will survey the literature. 
Literature Survey
The literature on bidding pattern in ascending auctions is divided into three parts.
First is theoretical papers that usually demonstrate the condition under which straightforward bidding is equilibrium and when we expect jump bidding. The lack of any model of English auction with affiliated values and discrete bid levels is noticeable.
Second is the experimental literature that demonstrates the existence of jump bidding, sometimes with a model that supports jump bidding. Third is empirical literature that demonstrates the existence of the jumps as well. The current paper is fills the gap by reporting and then analyzing jump bidding in a regular sequential open outcry English auction. Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) explored the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions. They addressed the question of when it is optimal to skip a bid level. They demonstrated that, in a two-bidder game with private valuations drawn from no increasing distributions, "pedestrian bidding" by both bidders is equilibrium as long as the interval between allowed bids is not too big. with private valuation who will potentially compete over one unit. There is demand uncertainty and with probability q the opponent will not find the auction. They found that, when costs are zero, the ratchet solution is equilibrium. When costs are positive, the item can be sold only after one or two stages or remain unsold. They examined their model assumption using Yankee-type Internet auctions 3 and found that jump bidding is more likely earlier in the auction and that the incentive for jump bidding increased as competition became stronger. They also found that jump bidders placed fewer bids and that increased early jump bidding in auctions reduced the total bids placed.
Avery (1998) has shown that a jump bid may be used to intimidate one's opponents and serves as a correlating device among bidders. The choice of bids allows bidders to communicate within the auction, and the jump can signal aggressive behavior. Adding signaling stages to the game will reduce the average price and the set of equilibrium produce exactly the set of expected prices between the first-price and secondprice auction.
Isaac et al (2003, a) provided a dynamic model of bidding in ascending auctions.
They solved the model using backward induction and dynamic programming to obtain the solution for two risk-neutral bidders with private valuations that draw their values from a uniform or normal distribution. They found that jump bidding occurs in equilibrium, is of moderate size, and is motivated by impatience and a combination of distribution and discreteness reasons. In addition, there is a convergence to the straightforward bidding, and the expected revenue in the straightforward bidding is slightly higher. The authors provided evidence from the FCC auction to the existence of jump biddings. Table 1 summarizes the different models' predictions and assumptions.
[ Table 1 here]
The empirical and experimental literature on jump bidding is quite narrow. Plott and Salmon (2002) developed a model of the behavior of bidders in simultaneous ascending auctions, in each round, based on surplus maximization and bid minimization.
The purpose is to give the auctioneer an idea of the bidders' valuation during the auction process. They demonstrated that the model is valid in an experimental setting and also in the United Kingdom third generation mobile auction. The authors observed jump bids but concluded that their influence is only on speed and not on final prices or allocation. Isaac et al. (2003, b) used economic experiments to empirically determine which of three alternative models described bidding behavior in a non clock ascending auction.
They found that their model was superior and rejected the straightforward bidding because they observed jump biddings. Their focus was on descriptive statistics and a parametric model of jump bidding. They also conducted a laboratory experiment. They found that bidders never jumped their own bids, seldom bid over publicly stated market values, and frequently submitted jump bids.
In addition, they found that the number of bidders has a negative effect on the magnitude of the jump bids. to bid for a large or small license. They also found that, although the majority of bids in the auction were the lowest admissible bids, there were a significant number of jump bids. The motivation they offered for the jumps was that bidders try to avoid ties and try to speed up the auction. They reported that jump bids in early rounds were larger than in the later rounds.
Betton and Eckbo (2000) examined a sample of tender offers. When the bid contest lasted more than two stages, they found that the expected time to the second bid was 15 days and that the median jump bidding from the first offer to the second offer was 10%. The setting of tender offers is different, theoretically and in practice, from an oral English auction for several reasons. Hirshleifer and Png (1990), for example, 4 A silent auction is a simultaneous ascending first price auction where usually donated items are placed in a central location with a bid sheet and a starting bid. This institution usually used by churches and other non-profit organization for fund raising.
demonstrated that, when there is a cost to make and revise a takeover bid, the theoretical equivalence between an English auction and a takeover target breaks down.
Haile and Tamer "Average Jump" is defined as the last offer before the wining bid minus the First Jump divided by n-2, where n is the total number of bids made on the car.
[ Table 2 here]
The mean number of bids is the average number of bids each item received before it was sold. The mean of this variable is 11.39, which indicates that it took, on average, 11.39 rounds for an item to be sold. The minimum of this variable is 1, which means that some of the cars were won by the first bidder. Figures [ Figure 4 here] Figure 5 shows the empirical distribution of the Last Jump. The value of the Last Jump, which is the difference between the winning bid and the preceding bid, appears on the x-axis, with the frequency on the y-axis. We can see that the most frequent event is that the winner increases the current bid by $50, which is the case for 369 cars.
[ Figure 5 here]
We can conclude the following from the above charts and table. First, jump biddings are important phenomena. Of the four variables described above, all of them are significantly above the minimum bid increment. Bidders use jumps to advance their bids in all the auction stages. In addition, there is a pattern, on average, that the First Jump is greater then the Second Jump, which is greater then the Average Jump, which is greater then the Last Jump. 6 The question that arises is, "Why do jump biddings exist?" It does not seem rational for bidders to progress and submit offers that are above the minimum bid increment (the ratchet solution). This paradox is noticeable in the Last Jump chart.
For more than 150 cars that were auctioned, the winning bid was increased by $100 or more when it could have been increased by only $25. The winner did not know when he bid that he would win, but it is still puzzling.
There might be several explanations for the jump bidding phenomenon.
1) Agents value their time: In this sense, a bidder will immediately jump to the lower bound of the valuation support (which explains the First Jump phenomena), and they might then progress in steps that are above the minimum bid increment. In addition, if there is a social pressure to finish the auction fast, bidders will feel uncomfortable to advance their bids by the minimum bid increment in the beginning and proceed instead in bigger steps.
2) Comfort: It is easy to work with round numbers. It is easier for some of the agents to add 100 than increments of 25 or 75. As we can see from the figures describing the Second Jump, Average Jump and Last Jump, there are spikes at $100 and $50.
In addition, none of the items had a second jump of $75 or $125.
3) Signaling and threat: As pointing out by Avery (1998) , under affiliated values paradigm, jumps may signal to and coordinate with opponents about an agent's valuation. In addition, jumps may signal that an agent is a strong candidate and will bid aggressively to win the object.
4) Distribution:
We can observe a rational jump bidding because of distribution of the valuation. If, for example, the distribution is increased above the support in a two-bidder game with private values, we may observe optimal jump biddings.
Also, it is easy to demonstrate that, even with uniform distribution of valuation, an optimal jump bidding may occur when the auction progresses only in discrete steps (Rothkopf et al., 1994 ).
5) Agents: It might be the case that people participating in these auctions are following the orders of their employees. For example, a worker in a dealership might have instructions to bid a maximum of $x on an item, but have no instructions about the bidding process.
6) Bounded rationality: People might behave sub optimally and deviate from optimal behavior as predicted by the theory.
Initial Regression Analysis
To explore the relationship between jump biddings and car characteristics, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is applied. Table 3 shows the regression results of the different types of jumps on a variety of explanatory variables. Each column corresponds to a different jump bidding variable. The explanatory variables in the models are the presale estimator (Estimator), the number of years the car has been used (Year) (2001/02 minus the manufacture year), the mileage that appears on the odometer divided by 10,000 (Mileage), the order in which the car was auctioned divided by the total number of cars in the particular auction 7 (Order), and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the car was in poor condition (Poor) and 0 otherwise. In addition, there are fixed-effects dummies for the different auctions (Auction dummies).
[ Table 3 here]
In the first four columns, I run the regression using all observations, whereas in the last two columns I use only the items that received more than one offer. 8 The constant is significant in all specifications and keeps the same pattern as in the means: First Jump is greater then the Second Jump, which is greater then the Average Jump, which is greater then the Last Jump. The Year variable is significant and with the "right sign" only in the First Jump variable. On average, each additional year the car has been used will reduce the First Jump (offer) by $45. It is not significant in the Second Jump, Average
Jump, or Last Jump variables. The Mileage is negative and significant in all of the specifications except the Last Jump. Another point of interest is that unlike the selling price, the order the object is auctioned has no effect on the jump biddings. The condition of the car (Poor) has no effect on the jump variables either. This could be because the presale estimator already captures this information.
The fact that the presale estimator and other measure condition affect all the jump bidding variables suggests that there is some strategic behavior in the way bidders advance their bids. If one believes that the bidders arrive at the auction place with just a number that they plan to stop at and do not consider the process leading up to this number As a robustness check, and because I do not know the true theoretical model that governs the jumps, I run the same regressions, this time with log of the monetary 9 Bidders in stage 0 do not know that the auction will end after one round. They know however that the next stage is the First Jump.
variables (the presale estimator and the different jump variables) instead of levels. The results, showed in Table 3A , are qualitatively very similar.
[ Table 3A here]
Common Values or Private Values?
It is reasonable to assume that used car auctions are common value auctions, and in this section I will demonstrate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the data are consistent with models assuming common valuations. The method I will use to distinguish between the common and private value paradigms in oral English auctions is different from the method usually suggested in the literature because the information available to the researcher in those auctions is different from the information available in sealed-bid auctions. First, even if the attendant number of bidders could be controlled for, the active number of bidders cannot. Second, information about each candidate bidding in each stage is not available. In addition, I will demonstrate that there is a positive relationship between jump biddings, which again suggests some strategic behavior during the auction process.
In Table 4 , I report the results demonstrating the positive relationship between the jump biddings. Each column in the table corresponds to a different regression. When the column title is Average Jump, for example, it means that it was the dependent variable in that regression. All regressions include a constant, the presale estimator, the year of manufacture, the mileage as it appears on the odometer, the order the car was sold, and a dummy variable for the specific auction. Similar results were obtained when any subset of this model was applied. I report only the jump variable coefficients from those regressions because they are my main interest and it saves space.
[ Table 4 here]
The first column indicates that the size of the First Jump affects the size of the Second Jump, 10 with an increase in the First Jump leading to an increase in the Second 10 Daniel and Hirshleifer (1998) provide a model for sequential bidding when there is a cost associated with submitting or revising a bid. Proposition 2 of their paper states that the jump between the first and the second bid is increasing in the initial bid for all identically distributed valuation densities satisfying some regular restriction on the density function. In our notation, the proposition states that we expect to have a Again, as a robustness check I run the same regressions with log instead of levels. The results, showed in Table 4A , are qualitatively very similar.
Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) provide a model of an independent private value
English auction with a discrete bid increment. In their model, bidders draw their values from nonincreasing distributions (e.g., uniform or exponential), and the pedestrian bidding by the bidders is equilibrium. Therefore, my findings so far refute their model's assumptions. The fact that there are jump biddings implies that the assumption of the independent private values or of non increasing distribution is not appropriate to my data.
The results presented in Table 4 and Table 4A support the claim that there is some strategic bidding behavior in the auction process and that some of the jump variables affect other jump variables. Natural question that arise at this point is whether jump biddings have a real effect on the auction outcome and they affect the winning bid. Avery (1998) solved the English auction game of two risk-neutral bidders with affiliated common values. He found that, under the proposed equilibrium, jump biddings may be employed to intimidate one's opponents and serve as a correlating device between bidders. The fact that the jumps are used as a correlating device suggests that the selling price might be path dependent. In other words, the jumps might affect the winning bid outcome. If one thinks, on the other hand, about the private value paradigm, the jumps should have no real effect on the winning bid. In that sense, the history of the bids will positive significant sign on the First Jump variable when running a regression with the Second Jump as a dependent variable.
not affect the winning bid because there is no winner's curse in a private value auction. A reasonable strategy, under the regular assumption of a private value auction game, is to advance the bid as long as the opponent's current bid is below the valuation, no matter what the history is. Hence, we might have a test that will allow us to distinguish between common value and private value auctions. If the jumps affect the selling price of the good after controlling for all the other relevant covariates, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the auction involves a common value between bidders because the selling price is path dependent. Table 5 shows the regression results. The sample includes items receiving more than a one offer, although similar results were obtained using the whole sample. All regressions include fixed-effect auction dummies and interaction variables between the auction dummies and the other covariates (which are not reported here to save space).
Similar results are obtained when the log of the variables is used instead of the variables'
level and when the model that is being used is a subset of the above model. Table 5 shows that each of the jump variables is statistically significant and has prediction power for the selling price of the good. The goodness of fit is varied between the jump variables, and the best fit is for the First Jump. The First Jump is correlated with the selling price, which means that if there is causality between the First Jump and the selling price then the selling price is path dependent. This might lead to the conclusion that the auction data came from a common value auction.
[ Table 5 here]
Again, as a robustness check I run the same regressions with logs instead of levels. The results, showed in Table 5A , are qualitatively very similar.
I used the term correlation and not causation because there might be an endogeneity problem in the last regression and maybe the direction of causality is from the selling price to the First Jump. If this is the case we cannot conclude that there is a path dependency. First, to perform a Hausmann test to check for endogeneity, I had to find an instrument that is correlated with the First Jump, for example, but not with the winning bid. I have been unable to find such a variable, but even if I could, the problem would not be solved. We can demonstrate exogeneity by two means: statistical tests, when we have an instrument, and context. In our auction, for example, it is obvious from the context that all the covariates except the jump variables are exogenous: the year of manufacture, the mileage, and the condition of the car affect the selling price and not vice versa. In the relationship between the First Jump and the winning bid, we are interested in endogeneity in the causality sense. Does the First Jump affect the winning bid or does the winning bid cause the size of the First Jump? If the First Jump affects the winning bid, then we can be sure that the auction process is path dependent, and hence that is a common value auction.
Although the First Jump happens before the final bids and might be considered to be predetermined, one can claim that a bidder's strategy will be to bid a constant fraction of his valuation as the First Jump or to randomize his First Jump where the randomization is between 0 and his valuation. If this is the case, we will observe the same results with the opposite conclusion. 12 11 There might be other models consistent with the private valuation model as well. 12 Further evidence on this appears when I plot the graph describing the relation between the number of bids variable and the ratio between the difference between the winning bid and First Jump and the first bid, and the ratio between the difference between the winning bid and the First Jump and the winning bid. If the First Jump were a constant fraction of the winning bid, the slope of these curves should be 0 (because the variables are supposed to be constant). This is not the case.
The second model I consider, which is consistent with the private valuation paradigm, is one where bidders randomize their first offers. In this model, a bidder with a valuation of y will choose randomly a First Jump and will bid until his valuation. This kind of model fits the data and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the data can be characterized as a private values auction data. 13 In addition some might claim that in this model there is a technicality problem.
Because the jump variables are always less than or equal to the winning bid we might get positive and significant coefficients even when the jumps are drawn randomly. In order to deal with this claim I define a new variable: the ratio between the selling price and the presale estimator. There is no technicality in the relation between this variable and the jumps variable and no reason to predict that an increase in the jump will increase this variable. I report the results of these regressions in Table 5B (the results from regressions with logs are shown in Table 5C ). Again, the results demonstrate that in both models the jumps have a positive and significant effect on the ratio. These regressions support the conclusion that the jumps have real effects on the selling price.
[ Table 5B here]
[ Table 5C here]
In addition to the jump bidding, there is more evidence to support the above claim that this data came from a common value auction. First, I can identify that dealers make up a part of the population involved in this auction. This might support the common value assumption, because if the dealers came from the same market and did not know the exact demand, then two dealers that buying the same car would make the same profit, hence resulting in a common value auction. 14 Additional evidence is provided in Raviv (2003), where I show (using the same data set) that the sequence of selling prices is upward sloping in the first part of the auction and then remains constant for the rest of the auction. These findings are in line with the predictions of Milgrom and Weber (1982) , who demonstrate that, when the agents have affiliated common values, we expect an 13 Consider, for example, the following model: bidders draw their private valuation y from a uniform (0, 1) distribution. Then they draw their First Jump x such that x=αy where α is drawn from a uniform (0, 1) distribution as well. In this case, when we run the simple regression model y=a+bx the expected value estimator of b will be 0.75. If we take the log of the variables the expected value of b will be 0.33. 14 It is still possible, hypothetically, for dealers to participate in a private-valuation auction. This could happen if, for example, the dealers came from different independent markets, but this seems unlikely in the case of car dealers in New Jersey.
upward-sloping price pattern. In our data, this might suggest that returns to information revelation have been exhausted at some point and that agents have all the information they need about the common component of the objects.
The method suggested above of distinguishing between common-and privatevalue paradigms in oral English auctions is different from what is usually suggested in the literature. 15 The way to differentiate between the two paradigms empirically usually involves all the bids submitted from all bidders (typically in sealed bid auctions) and the assumption that, with private value, we expect a monotonic increase of winning bids in the number of bidders, whereas with common value, we expect that the individual bid function may first increase (because of competition increase) but will eventually decrease (because of the winner's curse). This information is not usually available to the researcher in an oral English auction because, even if the attendant number of bidders could be controlled for, the effective number of bidders cannot. Second, information about each candidate bidding in each stage is not available. The suggested method (by relying on observable information) can help in determining the auction type.
Conclusions
Standard auction models describe the English oral auction as a clock auction in which an auctioneer raises the price continuously and each bidder chooses when to drop out. This description, however, prevents jump biddings from happening. When a new offer is submitted that is above the old offer plus the minimum bid increment, we refer to that as a jump bidding. This phenomenon is known to occur in reality but has not been fully documented in the auction literature. A rigorous empirical investigation of jump biddings in English auctions does not exist.
In this paper, the characteristics of bid offers and jump biddings in sequential English oral auctions is empirically examined using a car auction data set I collected during 2001 and 2002 from New Jersey DSS in Trenton. I defined four variables that measure jumps and found that jump biddings are an important real-world phenomenon. 15 See, for example, Paarsch (1992) and Haile, Hong, and Shum (2002) For almost all of the items sold, bidders do not follow the ratchet solution but rather use jump biddings to increase the current offer. Furthermore, there is a pattern in the jump size. On average, for each item sold, the first offer is the largest jump, and the last offer is the smallest jump. I offer several explanations for the existence of jump biddings and examine them using regression analysis. The entire set of jump variables depends on the presale estimator but not on the order the items are sold. These findings suggest that there is strategic bidding behavior in the auction process.
I use jump biddings, and specifically the First Jump, to determine whether the auction of interest is a private-or common-value auction. This approach uses the fact that selling prices in a common value auction may be path dependent, whereas in private value auctions, they are not. A simple test of the effect of the First Jump on the selling price then determines the type of the auction. I perform this test and conclude that the auctions I observed can be characterized as common value auctions. On the other hand, the data are also consistent with several private value models, since the regression analysis I performed demonstrates only correlation between the jumps and the selling price and not causation. One problem that arises if indeed there is a path dependency is that an increase in the First Jump will on average increase the winning bid. Usually, in the theoretical models that accommodate jumps, the incentive to make jump bidding is to reduce the expected selling price. If indeed there is path dependency and an increase in the first jump leads to higher selling price it does not seem rational to perform the jumps.
But this is true for any jump during the auction process and the same intuitive explanation provided for the existence of jumps in general will hold for the First Jump as well. For further empirical research, I suggest testing for the effect of the first offer on the selling price when pure private value goods are being auctioned. If there is no effect, it supports the proposed test for deciding between the private and common value paradigm in an oral English auction.
In Standard errors are in parentheses. All the regressions include auction dummies fixed effects. Mileage is the mileage that appears on the odometer divided by 10000 and Order is the order the car was auctioned divided by the total number of cars in the particular auction. Standard errors are in parentheses. All the regressions include auction dummies fixed effects. Mileage is the mileage that appears on the odometer divided by 10000 and Order is the order the car was auctioned divided by the total number of cars in the particular auction. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include a constant, the presale estimator, the year of manufacture, the mileage as it appears on the odometer, the order the car was sold, and a dummy variable for the specific auction. Similar results are obtained when any subset of this model is applied Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include a constant, the log of the presale estimator, the year of manufacture, the mileage as it appears on the odometer, the order the car was sold, and a dummy variable for the specific auction. Similar results are obtained when any subset of this model is applied. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes items receiving more than a single offer. Mileage is the mileage as it appears on the odometer divided by 10,000. All regressions include auction fixed-effect dummies and interaction terms between the auction dummies and the other covariates. Similar results are obtained when the log variables, instead of the variables' levels, are used and when the model used is a subset of the above model. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes items receiving more than a single offer. Mileage is the mileage as it appears on the odometer divided by 10,000. All regressions include auction fixed-effect dummies.
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